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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Examining the threat of piracy and armed robbery against
ships in the Sibutu Passage and surrounding sea areas

Degree:

Master of Science

This article discusses the threat of maritime piracy and armed robbery in the Sibutu
Passage, Philippines, and its surrounding sea areas, as well as how to achieve viable
and long-term peace and security for vessels passing through the area. As one of the
busiest straits, ensuring vessel safety in the subject areas also means warranting the
security of international trade. Although there has been a decrease in the number of
incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in most Asian locations, the threat
remains imminent as long as there is a gap in law enforcement measures and the
source of the problem prevails.
By employing a mixed research method, this research effort assessed the Philippine
government's and neighboring states' coordinated initiatives to enhance policies and
the operational mechanisms in countering and preventing the threat of piracy and
armed robbery against ships in Sibutu Passage and its surrounding sea areas.
Notable findings include the absence of a dedicated doctrine of operation in the area
of study; territorial disputes among concerned States; organizational flaws in the
Philippine government security sector; inadequate provision of fundamental support
systems such as logistical and other resource requirements; and major gaps and
challenges in the inter-agency approach employed by the security forces in the area
of study. Given this reality, incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships will
remain volatile until a feasible and sustainable mechanism has been formulated.
KEYWORDS: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Armed Robbery Against Ships, Joint Peace
and Security Coordinating Committee (JPSCC), National Coast Watch Council
(NCWC), Piracy, Sibutu Passage, Philippines
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Chapter 1: Introduction
International trade and the world economy largely depend on maritime transport. In
most developing countries, over 80% of global trade is conducted using the sea
(UNCTAD, 2021). However, as the amount and value of international trade have
increased, so has international shipping's exposure and susceptibility to piracy, armed
robbery, and other crimes (UNCTAD, 2017). Piracy and armed robbery against ships,
in particular, are major threats to the global marine transportation system, with direct
consequences for ships, ports, terminals, cargo, and seafarers. They have evolved
into a comprehensive transnational security dilemma affecting lives, livelihoods, and
global welfare as these activities have become more extensive and complicated
(UNCTAD, 2014; ReCAAP, 2020).

The human cost of piracy is high, as seafarers are the first victims of piracy or armed
robbery. They are frequently kidnapped and may be injured or killed in the process.
Due to the 229 incidents in 2020, more than 100 people were taken hostage, and
several were injured (UNODC, 2022). Additionally, pirate attacks not only put the crew
in danger but also slowed down ships and damaged cargo. Shipping companies also
adapt by rerouting ships or investing in armed guards, electric fencing, razor wire,
water cannons, and other weapons (Bendall, 2010; Dalaklis, 2012; Singh, 2019).
Also, shippers bear the inherent costs of piracy, like pay increases and amplified
insurance premiums. All of these expenses have an economic component and raise
the cost of shipping goods, which ultimately has an impact on the welfare of trading
nations (Kouakou et al., 2022; Sandkamp et al., 2022).

Worldwide incident reports from around the world persist in reminding the shipping
industry and the public of the violence and cruelty of many piracy and armed robbery
attacks, the dangers faced by those on board, and the significant human and property
losses that can occur (Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea - GARD, 2022). Although it
has not been in the news since 2011, and there have been no incidents off the coast
of Somalia so far from 2019 until the time of writing this paper, there has been a
noticeable rise in the Gulf of Mexico (Dalaklis & Nordfjeld, 2020). Consequently, some
attribute such occurrences to poor ocean governance and a lack of a maritime

security strategy on behalf of the relevant concerned nations (Nordfjeld & Dalaklis,
2021). As this is the case, the issue becomes relevant in the context of the Sibutu
Passage on the Philippine Island of Mindanao (Figure 1).

Figure 1:
Location of the Research Area

Source: Google Map as edited by the researcher

Although the 2021 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) annual report declared that there
had been a decrease in the number of pirate attacks and armed robberies in most
Asian locations, the threat remains imminent as long as there is a gap in law
enforcement measures and the source of the problem prevails. For this purpose,
Chapters 1 and 2 respectively describe and outlines the geographical details of the
area of study, its security threats, and other underlying factors surrounding the subject
matter. By analyzing the circumstances in Sibutu Passage, Philippines, and its
surrounding sea areas, this article employs a mixed research method to examine the
various policies, initiatives, operational mechanisms, and community participation
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used to combat maritime piracy and robbery in chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
Subsequently, the findings will be used to improve programs by recommending areas
for improvement to make them more efficient and sustainable. Furthermore, exploring
and describing the situations of the Sibutu Passage and its surrounding areas will
help not only in understanding the current condition but also assist policymakers in
developing and improving policies that will assist and address issues of maritime
piracy and robbery in the research area. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the
analyzed and discussed data in the conclusion, as well as the recommendations that
follow.

1.1 Research Questions
This research effort is anchored on the assumption that piracy and armed robbery
against ships continue to transpire despite the different efforts to quell it because of
the failure to understand the peculiarity and local context of the area of study; thus,
the need for a dedicated operational mechanism to address piracy and armed robbery
against ships in the Sibutu passage and its surrounding sea areas. From these, the
study specifically aims to answer three questions:

1. What are the current mechanisms and policies in place to combat the threat
of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Sibutu passage and
surrounding sea areas?
2. What operational mechanisms are utilized by the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP), and Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) to counter and prevent maritime piracy and robbery?
3. How can policies and operational mechanisms be improved to prevent
maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Sibutu Passage and
surrounding sea areas?
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1.2 Significance of Study
This study primarily aims to contribute to understanding localizing policies and
operational mechanisms to quell maritime piracy and robbery by studying the
situations in Sibutu Passage, Philippines, and surrounding sea areas. Moreover, it
also aimed to improve the different programs implemented by recommending some
areas for improvement to strengthen and make the program more efficient and
sustainable. Furthermore, exploring and describing the conditions of the Sibutu
Passage and its surrounding areas will aid policymakers in developing and improving
policies that will assist and address maritime piracy and robbery issues in the
Philippines, which also affect neighboring areas.

1.3 Scope and Limitations
This study is focused on the analysis of documents used by law enforcement
agencies in the efforts to counter maritime piracy and robbery. Furthermore, the
measures in terms of operational mechanism, interagency coordination, and
community participation were assessed based on the interview and survey of the
respondents. However, the arguments that the legal system faces in defining and
differentiating between piracy and armed robbery against ships in accordance with
international law will not be covered in this research effort. Furthermore, the political
aspect and related laws relative to piracy and armed robbery against ships will not be
covered. Likewise, this paper will mostly concentrate on the challenges during the
implementation were identified, together with the recommendations that served as the
basis for enhancing collaboration and operational mechanisms of the security forces
in the study area. Finally, data collection is constrained to one month due to COVID19 and time constraints.
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Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature
2.1 Conceptualizing Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery
Many books and articles have discussed the importance of people working together
to understand maritime security and piracy. Given this, piracy and armed robbery
against ships continue to be an under-examined problem (Raymond, 2009; Dalaklis,
2012; Ishii, 2014; Liss, 2014; Khaerany & Maskun, 2016; Ismail, 2021). As stated in
the study's limitations, the legal framework's challenges in defining and distinguishing
between piracy and armed robbery against ships in accordance with international law
will not be investigated. Nevertheless, its legal aspects will be broadly discussed to
place the matter in proper perspective in conceptualizing maritime piracy and armed
robbery against ships.

As discussed by Dalaklis & Mejia (2022), "crime" or security threats involve two
elements: MOTIVE (easy profit for a pirate or "armed robber"); and OPPORTUNITY
(geographical factors, such as slowing down when crossing a busy waterway or the
State's inability to uphold the "Rule of Law," or failing to implement the required
security measures). On the one hand, Section 14 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
states the general principle that “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State.” On the other hand, the United Nations Third Conference on
the Law of the Sea from 1973 to 1982 was convened to produce a single treaty on
the international law of the sea (Laroya, 2000; Wallner & Kokoszkiewicz, 2019).

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which went into
effect on November 16, 1994, was adopted as a result of the conference on April 30,
1982. Provisions 100 through 107 of UNCLOS comprise eight articles regarding
piracy. These UNCLOS provisions resemble the 1958 Geneva Convention provisions
in almost every way (Laroya, 2000; Ahmad, 2020). Article 101 of the UNCLOS defines
piracy as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft and directed:
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(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a or b)

It is important to note that States that are not signatories to the 1982 UNCLOS or the
1958 Geneva Convention follow international customary law. Although the vast
majority of states have ratified either of the above codifications, it goes without saying
that if a state is not a signatory, it will treat piracy following international customary
law. According to international customary law, pirates are "hostes humani generis,"
or "enemies of the human race," (Laroya, 2000; Wallner & Kokoszkiewicz, 2019;
Rozas, 2021). Over the years, pirate tactics and equipment are growing more
sophisticated, and piracy is intensifying in some places, with more frequent
kidnappings of the crew for ransom (Dalaklis, 2012; Tumbarska, 2018).

Consequently, anti-piracy measures are being developed and implemented on
numerous vessels simultaneously. Moreover, organizations such as the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) were formed to combat piracy worldwide. Despite this,
pirate attacks are becoming increasingly successful all over the world. Improved selfprotection mechanisms are becoming increasingly vital to safeguard the safety of
ships and their crews (Tumbarska, 2018). Ahmad (2020) discussed that the global
legal framework against maritime piracy has developed over time. Pirate attacks
increase every few years, particularly with modernized ships and weapons. As such,
dealing with maritime piracy requires coordinated domestic, regional, and
international coordination.
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2.2. Sulu-Celebes Sea and Sibutu Passage
Given that this is not a research effort dedicated to determining the merits or demerits
of the Philippines' or Malaysia's respective claims, the researcher will treat Sabah as
if it were a part of Malaysia throughout only for clarity and uniformity. The SuluCelebes (Sulawesi) Sea is made up of two large seas (Sulu and Sulawesi/Celebes),
which cover an area of 900,000 km2 and include the majority of the Philippine Islands,
the Malaysian state of Sabah, and Indonesia's northernmost islands (see figure 2)
(DeVantier et al., 2005; Ellett, 2021;). The Lombok and Makassar Straits, the Celebes
Sea, and the Sibutu Passage are used by deep draft ships that cannot pass through
the Malacca Strait, while the Mindoro Strait is used by ships leaving the Philippine
archipelago (Diciano, 2019). The Sibutu Passage is located within the Sulu-Celebes
Seas and is vital to the environmental and socioeconomic activities of the three
nations - Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia (Devantier et al., 2004; Li et al., 2019; Ellett,
2021).

Figure 2:
Geographical location of areas concerned

Source: Google Map as edited by the researcher
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It is a deep channel between the Philippine islands of Sibutu, Simunul, and Bongao
in the province of Tawi-Tawi, Philippines separating Borneo from the Sulu
Archipelago. Despite the narrow width of the Sibutu passage, which is only about 29
kilometers wide, it is estimated that 17,000 vessels pass through, connecting
international shipping routes worth 40 billion USD each year (Diciano, 2019).
According to the Joint Interagency Task Force West Public Affairs (2017), the said
area faces significant economic and governance challenges despite its significance
in commercial and maritime trade. The region has a well-deserved reputation for
lawlessness and violence, whereby militant and criminal activity has made terrorist
attacks, piracy, and kidnapping for ransom an everyday reality, affecting the region's
people almost daily. Consequently, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia are all
considering new ways to cooperate on security issues due to the increased disruption
of legitimate fishing and trade.

2.3 Maritime Piracy Challenges in the Tri-Border Area Efforts
The tri-border area (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia) has long served as a
crossroads for transnational crime and conflict because of corruption, poor
governance, poverty, porous border, and limited coastal infrastructure (Chalk, 2018).
According to Stach (2017), while regional maritime agencies' capabilities have
improved, several countries still lack operational boats and equipment. Another
stumbling block was the lack of cooperation between Southeast Asian governments
and between Southeast Asian and other nations. Factors such as disputed claims of
islands or maritime space ownership, worries over sovereignty, and competing for
national interests have impeded meaningful cooperation. The most visible example
of limited cooperation is the Malacca Straits’ Patrol Network naval patrols, which were
coordinated rather than joint patrols, implying that hot pursuit into and patrolling
adjacent countries' waters was not permitted (Raymond 2009; Stach 2017).

According to Chalk (2018), when analyzing the tri-border area situation, due to the
porousness of the tri-border area, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte moved to
actively collaborate with Indonesia and Malaysia in establishing a trilateral maritime

8

domain awareness regime in the tri-border area based on three main pillars of action:
a. coordinated marine policing, modeled after the Malacca Strait patrol system
established in 2004 by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; b. qualified rights of hot
pursuit, granted case-by-case basis; and c. To simplify intelligence sharing and
dissemination, national focal points will be established and connected by a shared
hotline. This combination of unilateral and multilateral approaches to securing the triborder area has proven effective, with attack levels dropping significantly. Only seven
actual or attempted Armed Maritime Crimes (AMC) occurrences and piracy had been
registered in the Sulu and Celebes Seas in the previous 12 months as of January
2018. However, there is not much space for complacency.

The tri-border area will remain a potential maritime crime hotspot for the foreseeable
future due to the Abu Sayyaf Group's (ASG’s) general resilience and the size and
archipelagic character of the area to be monitored. Despite ongoing sovereignty
disputes, one of the discussed mechanisms in the interview to secure the SuluCelebes seas, including the Sibutu Passage, was the establishment of a Trilateral
Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia
(IndoMalPhil), incorporating coordinated patrols and information-sharing. This
agreement included sea and air patrols as well as the establishment of operations
headquarters in each nation. Said measure is in response to kidnapping activities by
militant organizations in 2016. During the pandemic, these activities were reduced.
Recently, these efforts to secure maritime spaces continued and strengthened
(Parameswaran, 2022).

2.4 The Abu Sayyaf Group and the Sulu Archipelago
The Asian Foundation (2019) declared that the ASG had been involved in piracy,
kidnapping for ransom, and other types of criminal activity on the seas and islands
between the Zamboanga peninsula in the Philippines and Borneo for more than three
decades (See Figure 3 in section 2.6). Although the group's violent acts were
previously more frequently associated with making money from their criminal activity,
in recent years, various factions have become more involved in terrorist violence. The
Superferry 14 bombing in 2004 that killed 116 people was carried out by the ASG and

9

was the first act of maritime terrorism to garner international attention. It continues to
be regarded as the deadliest terrorist attack at sea in history. The ASG was a Muslim
secessionist splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founded in
the early 1990s (Singh, 2019; Zelenkov et al., 2022). The closest islamic neighbors
of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have also regarded the ASG as a terrorist
organization in addition to western nations like the United States, Canada, and
Australia. Numerous intelligence agents have linked the group above to Jemaah
Islamiyah in Indonesia and Al Qaeda since the early 2000s. Additionally, it has been
verified that the two terrorist organizations are funding ASG. Although there have
been reports to the contrary, it is still convincing that many of its resources were
obtained through other illegal means, most notably kidnapping for ransom (KFR)
(Tarriela, 2019).

Although piracy and kidnapping for ransom frequently differ from ISIS-inspired
terrorism, as demonstrated by the bombing of the Jolo, Sulu Cathedral in 2019 and
the siege of Marawi, Philippines in 2017, ASG's involvement has heightened
awareness of the need to secure the Sulu archipelago and maritime trade between
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (The Asian Foundation, 2019). Typically,
terrorists hide in archipelago terrain, alternating between Basilan, Sulu, and the TawiTawi islands. The ASG pirates cruise in custom pump boats with a light timber frame
and two outboard engines to successfully maneuver around large ships that can
outrun maritime forces. Nevertheless, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and
Philippine National Police - Maritime Group (PNP-MG) do not have enough resources
to chase these vessels because of their speed (Sahrasad et al., 2018; Nahdohdin et
al., 2019).

Furthermore, resource distribution is inefficient, as pump boats' fuel costs significantly
less than PCG and PNP-MG boats. To deal with these issues, the police have devised
a strategy of setting up ambushes on select islands that target ASG. However,
additional work must be done to increase the PCG, PNP, and AFP's assets and
maritime capabilities. There were unintentional and purposeful skirmishes between
the Philippine Marines (PM) and the ASG in the Sulu Sea islands in 2018. These
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firefights saw many ASG militants engaged in combat, demonstrating the group's
combat strength again (Nahdohdin et al., 2019).

2.5 Regional Cooperation Initiatives
The establishment of ReCAAP represents a significant regional effort to counter
piracy and other forms of violent shipboard crime. It is Asia's first government-togovernment agreement to promote and expand cooperation and has helped combat
piracy and armed robbery against ships since its establishment in 2006. At the time
of writing this paper, there were 21 Contracting Parties in total, including the
Netherlands, Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the United States,
and Australia, in addition to the original North, Southeast, and South Asian countries
(ReCAAP ISC, n.d.) The initiative aims to develop multilateral cooperation to address
the menace of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Its activities include sharing
information, building capacity, and forming partnerships (Rustam et al., 2022)

However, as of the writing of this paper, the declaration of Win et al., 2016 still holds
true that it does not adequately solve the problem due to Malaysia and Indonesia's
refusal to ratify a restrictive definition of maritime crimes, information-sharing system
limitations, weak capacity building, and a lack of specific cooperation arrangements.
As a result, it is advised that the existing contracting parties encourage Malaysia and
Indonesia to become ReCAAP contracting parties to close the region's most
significant deficit. It is also proposed that piracy and armed robbery against ships be
expanded to include clandestine thefts, threats of violence, and attempted piracy and
armed robbery against ships when defining marine crimes. Furthermore, the
contracting parties should take precautions and preventive measures to combat not
only piracy and armed robbery against ships but also terrorist attacks against all types
of ships and marine infrastructures, such as lighthouses, ports and offshore platforms
for oil and gas exploration, among other things.

Again, the UNCLOS definition of piracy stipulated in section 2.1 that an act of piracy
must involve two ships; thus, an attack on a single ship will not be considered piracy
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under this definition. As a result, removing the two-ship criterion from the ReCAAP's
definition of piracy is desirable (Ansari et al., 2014). Raymond (2009) and Stach 2017
believe that in the short term, it appears that modest levels of piracy will continue in
the areas of concern until remedies that target the fundamental causes of the problem
rather than merely the symptoms are created. To minimize unemployment, economic
development in Indonesia's, Malaysia's, and the Philippines’ coastal areas must be
fostered, and local officials' corruption must be addressed. Current antipiracy
measures, on the other hand, should not be disregarded; they require constant
enhancement to keep up with the evolving nature of piracy on the waterway.

2.6 ReCAAP Records of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
In the recent data from ReCAAP in figure 3 for the 2007-2021 cases of piracy and
armed robbery against ships in Asia, eight armed robberies (in territorial/archipelagic
waters) were reported in November 2021. There was no piracy incident (on the high
seas) reported. Seven of the eight events were actual incidents, while the eighth was
an attempted incident. A total of 72 events were reported in Asia from January to
November 2021. Compared to January to November 2020, this is a 24% drop (95
incidents). Except for the Singapore Strait (SS), most regions had a decrease in
incidents. The situation in the SS is nevertheless a source of concern.

The SS experienced an increase in events from January to November 2021, with 41
incidents compared to 34 incidents in the same period in 2020. The SS has already
had its third most significant number of incidents since 2007 - 99 incidents in 2015
and 47 incidents in 2014. Likewise, no crew has been reported kidnapped for ransom
in the Sulu-Celebes Seas or the waters near Eastern Sabah since January 2020. The
threat, however, remains high because the commanders of the Abu Sayyaf Group,
who are responsible for the abduction of sailors in the Sulu area, are still on the loose
(ReCAAP-ISC, 2021).
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For the year 2020, it can be noted that there was a 32% increase in cases as
compared to 2019. Although the upsurge was spread across Asian waters, it was
similar to what occurred in 2016 in the vast seas surrounding the islands of Mindanao,
Sulawesi, and East Kalimantan, where the notorious ASG terrorist group based in
Mindanao, Philippines, conducted their hybrid kidnap-for-ransom operations.
According to the ReCAAP reports, pirates kidnapped 66 crew members between
2016 and 2018, and the ASG executed ten of them. Because of these crimes, the
waters surrounding the Southern Philippines have been dubbed the "next Somalia"
by an Indonesian Security Minister (Diciano, 2019).
Figure 3:
2007-2021 cases of piracy and armed robbery against ship incidents in Asia

Source: ReCAAP 2021 Annual Report

From this, it can be construed that little has been said that piracy continues to be an
essential issue that needs to be explored. More so, in the literature, it can be taken
that in terms of policy-making, understanding the collaboration of different
international and national stakeholders is the framework for securing maritime seas.
However, despite these actions and collaborations, maritime piracy continues to
happen in the context of the Sulu Archipelago. Departing from the current
conceptualization of maritime policies, this study highlights the importance of
understanding the local context to localized policies and operational mechanisms to
quell piracy and armed robbery against ships.
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2.7 Philippine Maritime Security Agencies
The Philippine National Security Strategy and Policy, according to Batongbacal
(2021), compartmentalizes the treatment of maritime security. Although both
documents recognize the nation's broad maritime interests, the term "maritime
security" is clearly used in a more limited sense that essentially involves monitoring
and controlling maritime activity to prevent certain undesirable activities or threats.
Priority was given to land-based over sea-based development until the South China
Sea dispute. According to Valenzuela et al. (2020), Philippine Army (PA) gets the
lion's share of the defense budget for historical reasons. Before the first modernization
program after World War II, the AFP focused on internal threats to national security
and left external security to its treaty ally, the US. The Philippine Army needed
immediate reinforcements to combat internal threats. This mindset continues in the
21st century as the AFP faces a dwindling internal threat.

In the Philippines, three agencies work to secure their seas: PCG, PNP, and AFP’s
Philippine Navy (PN). Under Republic Act (RA) 9993, the PCG is mandated and
responsible for maritime security, maritime law enforcement, marine environmental
protection, maritime safety, and maritime search and rescue (R.A. No. 9993, 2009).
For more than a decade, the said organization has served as a significant maritime
force in various capacities for national security. PCG's budget has steadily increased
since 2008, allowing it to acquire modern assets and recruit additional troops. Its
mission is to make sure that people and property at sea are safe by conducting vessel
safety inspections on all domestic vessels has a significant impact on public safety
and the national economy, both of which rely heavily on the shipping industry.

Furthermore, as these foreign and domestic vessels navigate the perilous Philippine
waters, the PCG crucially strengthens the national government's strategy in
combating maritime piracy and robbery in the Sulu and Celebes Seas through
maritime domain awareness capability and strategic vessel deployment (Tarriela,
2021). On the other hand, the PNP under RA 6975 is entitled “An Act Establishing the
PNP under a reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government and Other
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Purposes” (R.A. 6975, 1990). As such, the PNP will enforce the law, stop and control
crime, keep the peace, and make sure of public safety and internal security with the
help of the community (PNP Website, 2022). According to Martinez (2019), the PNP
plays an important role in the community's development and progress. It is one of the
ways that peace and order are kept in the community and the municipality as a whole.
People are more likely to participate in community activities to raise everyone's
standard of living and well-being when they feel secure. In this sense, maintaining
peace and order lays the groundwork for real community-based development.

Likewise, the AFP under Commonwealth Act No. 1 or the National Defense Act of
1935 is “An Act To Provide For The National Defense Of The Philippines, Penalizing
Certain Violations Thereof, Appropriating Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes”
(C.A. No. 1, 1935). Hence, the AFP, with its three branches of service (PA, PN, and
PAF), is in charge of upholding the Republic of the Philippines' sovereignty,
supporting its Constitution, and protecting its territory from all enemies, foreign and
domestic. They are also in charge of advancing the country's policies, goals, and
interests; and preparing its regular and citizen armed forces' organization,
development, maintenance, and deployment for national security (AFP Website,
2022).

However, it is noteworthy that Morris (2017) claimed that navies are inappropriate for
enforcing maritime law within national borders because piracy and armed robberies
against ships may involve questions of sovereignty. In contrast to Maritime Law
Enforcement (MLE) patrols, the Navy's platform and personnel are better suited to
military campaigns and high-kinetic settings. Although some Southeast Asian navies
have the domestic legal authority to perform police work on the seas, naval
encounters may trigger a response from the naval forces of another nation, escalating
the situation, especially if naval vessels use force against civilian assets. Alternatively,
the coast guard personnel, use-of-force doctrine, platforms, and legal foundations are
designed for modern maritime states' wide range of MLE duties.
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2.8 National Coast Watch System
Expanding maritime interagency collaboration and cooperation among the various
government agencies and offices beyond the diplomatic aspect is necessary to stop
incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Thus, Monje (2012) asserted
that one of the most interesting collaborative projects is the development of the
National Coast Watch System (NCWS) in the Philippines. The CWS was first
conceived in 2006 and was established on 28 November 2008. It was initially intended
to boost Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the perilous Sulu Sea and, eventually,
the Philippine territory of the contentious Spratly island chain in the South China Sea.
NCWS is composed of three levels of management; a) the National Coast Watch
Council participates in the formulation of strategic plans and policies; b) the National
Coast Watch Secretariat is responsible for providing the Council with administrative
and technical support, and c) the National Coast Watch Center (NCWC) is in charge
of carrying out and upholding maritime regulations.

On September 6, 2011, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order (EO)
57, which established a multi-agency center for maritime surveillance and coordinated
response. Nevertheless, the advent of the Scarborough Shoal Standoff in 2012
revealed how ill-prepared the nation was to respond to such an event and presented
a challenge to the newly established National Coast Watch Council (Morales, 2019).
Consequently, the NCWC was established in 2015 as the nation's focal point for
coordinating maritime security. Said Center serves as a mechanism in the Philippines
to address issues with maritime security, safety, and environmental protection
(NCWC, 2015).

The NCWC managed an expanding Coast Watch System and became the backbone
of the Philippines' MDA through coastal surveillance. Even though it is not a complete
national maritime strategy, this is seen as an essential step toward defining the roles
of different agencies in the maritime security of the Philippines. While there will
undoubtedly be gaps in security forces' assets, and NCWC does not have the
authority to "command" like Thailand's Maritime Enforcement Command Centre
(MECC) across the border, it could help agencies work together better by serving as
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a hub and a repository for information about Philippine territorial waters (Edwards,
2019).

2.9 Joint Peace and Security Coordinating Council
To increase the capacity and interoperability of security forces to address both internal
and external threats, the PCG, PNP, and AFP signed a tripartite agreement known as
the Joint Peace and Security Coordinating Council (JPSCC) (Caliwan, 2021). Based
on the interview, the said agreement was originally between the AFP and PNP
through the Joint Letter Directive No. 07-2010, issued on November 24, 2010. The
PCG was made a member and designated its Commandant to Co-Chair of the said
center under the JPSCC Resolution 11-2021. Gonzales (2021) stated that the JPSCC
is responsible for developing and implementing plans for heightened security
operations,

monitoring

security

and

peace

conditions,

coordinating

the

implementation of necessary security and peace measures, initiating cross-training
and exercise programs between member units, and routinely evaluating the
effectiveness of member units. The JPSCC has the same national, regional, and
provincial structure. Furthermore, the National JPSCC has five (5) cells. They are the
following:

1. Joint Operations Cell - accountable for the organization and planning of law
enforcement operations against individuals, organizations, groups, activities,
or locations threatening the nation's stability and security. Additionally, they
conduct routine evaluations of the state of regional and national peace and
security and suggest practical steps to maintain it;
2. Joint Investigation and Intelligence Cell - layout a comprehensive picture of
the state's peace and security environment and is tasked with creating
mechanisms for more convenient and organized information sharing on topics
of shared interest.
3. Joint Civil-Military Operations-Police Community Relations Cell - facilitates
relationships, community development, and building-related activities.
Guaranteeing that the general public will easily access pertinent information
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on peace and security issues also validates the JPSCC's accountability and
transparency.
4. Joint Legal Cell - together with other relevant national government agencies,
they develop and oversee the execution of joint legal plans. Additionally, they
ensure that efforts to investigate and prosecute cases involving threats to
peace and security are appropriately coordinated.
5. Joint Training Cell - determines the parties' goals, principles, policies, and
priorities for education and training to ensure personnel competency and
operational readiness of units conducting joint/interagency operations.

In the JPSCC, however, it has to be noted that there were different prioritization or
focus because of other chains of command posed a challenge for the agencies
involved. The military cannot allocate all of its efforts and resources to internal
security, and law enforcement agencies cannot do the same for external threats.
Accordingly, one cannot dictate what steps or directions to take because each force
follows a unique chain of command and uses a different strategic process. Another
gap Gonzales (2021) found relevant to this research effort is tactical level
coordination. This is because campaign plans are developed and implemented at the
national level, then cascade down to the regional and provincial levels, and finally to
companies, platoons, and battalions on the ground. The personnel on the ground
must completely comprehend and understand the joint campaigns' goals and
strategies because they will be entrusted with carrying them out.

2.10 Establishment of Archipelagic Seal Lane
As UNCLOS is the legal framework that establishes each state's rights, duties, and
responsibilities with respect to its maritime jurisdictions, providing a legal framework
for the ocean and sea use, its provision under Archipelagic Sea Lane (ASL) also
specifies flexibility for archipelagic states (UNCLOS, 1982). Consequently, the
interview claims that the recognition of the Philippines to be under the regime of an
archipelagic state is one of the stimuli that can promote infrastructure, logistics, and
asset enhancement for the security forces. Although it is acknowledged worldwide
that the Philippines is an archipelagic state, it has not yet implemented ASL in its

18

archipelagic waters (Hernandez, 2019). In the article of Cervante (2022), the bill
establishing the ASL in the waters of the Philippine archipelago was overwhelmingly
approved by the House of Representatives on the third and final reading. Notably, at
the time of writing this paper, the proposed law for its establishment is still in process
and the Philippines’ Senate.. This proposed law is meant to stop international ships
from passing through the Philippine archipelago at will.

The bill includes the

coordinates (see Figure 4) for the air and sea lanes that allow for the swift and
continuous passage of foreign ships and aircraft over its territorial sea and adjacent
archipelagic waters.
Figure 4:
Philippines' Proposed Archipelagic Sea Lane

Source: Presentation of Henry S. Bensurto for the Philippines' proposed ASL
at the Center for Ocean Laws and Policies in Bali, Indonesia, in 2011.
Nevertheless, Hernandez (2019) expressed reservations about said House Bill.
Establishing ASL suggests that the Philippines will be required to offer suitable
navigational aids, a robust monitoring system, and seaborne law enforcement
resources, which indicates that the government should make a sizable financial
contribution to its establishment and upkeep. It has to be noted that with the passing
of said HB, the country will have a duty to keep this ASL navigable and obstructionfree. Consequently, its prioritization and appropriations in the national budget for its
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requirements must be considered on par with, if not ahead of, other priorities such as
agriculture, public works, and education.
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
3.1 Research Design
This study employed mixed methods of research. This methodology incorporates
multiple techniques to address research questions appropriately and principally,
which involves collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and documenting qualitative and
quantitative data (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The quantitative data of this study is
the assessment of the implementation of maritime security for countering and
preventing piracy in Sibutu in terms of operational mechanism, coordination among
stakeholders, and community participation. The data was gathered using a
researcher-made

validated

questionnaire

(Appendix

“A”).

The

challenges

experienced during implementing maritime security in terms of gaps and problems,
solutions given, and recommendations for enhancing maritime security were gathered
using a semi-structured interview. The interview guide questions is in Appendix “B”.

Semi-structured interviews are a widely preferred research technique focusing on
specified topics but conversationally covering them. This method uncovered the
motivations behind people's decisions and actions, their views, beliefs, and the effects
of specific policies or events on their lives (Raworth et al., 2019). The documents
related to maritime security in the Sibutu passage were identified by analyzing
memoranda, reports, and other supporting records. The qualitative data of this study
were gathered using documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. According
to O’Leary (2014), documentary analysis is qualitative research in which the analyst
reviews documents to assess an appraisal theme. Document analysis entails
categorizing content into topics, like how focus groups or interview transcripts are
analyzed.

3.2 Research Locale and Respondents
The research locale of the study is the Sibutu Passage, Mindanao, Philippines, and
its surrounding areas of the Sulu-Celebes Seas (see figure 2 in section 2.2). Table 1
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is the Philippines’ military and law enforcement officers and personnel participating
as respondents in the research. It consists of current and former personnel assigned
in Tawi-Tawi or nearby Sulu areas from the following:
Table 1:
Research Respondents from the Philippine Military and Law Enforcement Agencies

Table 1 summarizes the 165 respondents who took part in this study: 67 from PCG,
46 from AFP, and 41 from PNP.
Table 2: Description of respondents (see table 1)
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In the security forces of the Philippines, it is common for officers and personnel to
have multiple designations or the “generalist concept” (Tarriela, 2020). As such, Table
2 only shows the primary assignment/designation of each respondent rather than any
secondary designations for the sake of clarity and consistency. Officers and staff from
the AFP, PCG, and PNP who perform office tasks, designate troop assignments and
make administrative and sometimes operational decisions fall under the
administrative designation, which accounts for 48 or 29% out of the 165 respondents.
The technical position includes the officers and personnel who perform technical
duties such as boat engineers, information and technology experts, public works
engineers, repair and maintenance technicians, driver and mechanics, draftsmen,
public relations in charge of publication and information supports, and medical
practitioners, with a total of 22 or 13% of the respondents. Subsequently, 95 or 58%
of the respondents are primarily engaged in field works and have operational positions
in community relations, field education and training, K9, boat crew, maritime patrol,
surface support, checkpoints, sea marshal, civil-military operations, snipers, boarding
and search operations, intelligence operations, riflemen, grenadier, provincial
operations unit, and investigation unit.

3.4 Data Collection Procedure
Data collection was instituted primarily using a validated researcher-made
questionnaire (Appendix “A”). Questionnaire validation is necessary to determine if
the instrument is significant, meaningful, and valuable. Documents used by law
enforcement agencies related to maritime security were requested and analyzed to
determine their significance in countering and preventing piracy and robbery at the
Sibutu passage. Data collection focused on capturing the experiences of the law
enforcement agency representatives on implementing operational mechanisms in
terms of gaps and problems, solutions are given, and recommendations for its
enhancement. Semi-structured, open-ended interviews provided an interactive
process to invoke a comprehensive account of the respondent’s experience.
According to Van Manen et al. (2010), the phenomenological interview is unique as it
evokes descriptions of lived-through moments, experiential, anecdotal accounts,
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remembered stories of particular experiences, narrative fragments, and fictional
experiences.

The questionnaire was disseminated, and interview sessions were recorded,
transcribed, and coded through thematic analysis. As the most common method of
analyzing qualitative data, a thematic analysis will draw out the study's thematic area,
identify patterns and themes, and apply framing to describe the phenomenon under
investigation. Thematic analysis, through six phases, creates meaningful ways to
identify unfolded themes emergent from the data (Bernard et al., 2009).

3.5 Data Analysis and Statistical Treatment
The quantitative data gathered were recorded, tabulated, and analyzed based on the
problem stated.

The statistical analysis and treatment of data involved were

frequency and mean distribution. The computed mean was compared to the scale
below for interpretation.

As the most common method of analyzing qualitative data, thematic analysis was
utilized to draw out the study's thematic area, identify patterns and themes, and apply
framing to describe the phenomenon under investigation. Thematic analysis, through
six phases, creates meaningful patterns to identify unfolded themes emergent from
the data (Bernard & Ryan, 2009). In general, it can be inferred from the specific
findings and survey results in section 5 that most respondents (85%) believe that the
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operational mechanism of the security forces to combat maritime piracy and armed
robbery against ships in the study area is adequate. Although having a "set of clearly
stated objectives" received the highest mean rating, conducting research to improve
the operational mechanism received the lowest. Subsequently, most of the
respondents considered that coordination among the stakeholders is essential after
having the highest mean rating in the inter-agency coordination practices in the study
area. Ironically, the lowest mean rating was received on the “sharing of the
intelligence report.” The aforementioned matter indicates that there are differences
that impede solid coordination and collaboration between and among security forces
in the study area. Section 5.2 will go over the factors that could lead to such a gap in
greater detail. Finally, the Community participation practices in section 5.4 were found
to be satisfactory in terms of the degree of support and cooperation from the local
people.

3.7 Ethical Considerations
This research study followed ethical norms in research. The first is to promote the aim
of the study, such as knowledge, truth, and avoidance of error. Secondly is to deal
with cooperation and coordination among many different people in different
disciplines. This research effort also promotes values essential to collaborative work,
such as trust, accountability, mutual respect, and fairness. The third ethical norm is
accountability to the public. The researcher assured the informant's confidentiality of
the results.
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Documents Used by Security Forces
This chapter discusses the different policies on maritime security against piracy and
armed robbery against ships used by law enforcement agencies for the Sibutu
Passage. Based on the analysis of the policies, standard operating procedures,
publications, and other relevant documents, the following are the emerging themes:

4.1 National Policies and Interagency Collaboration Agreements
The interview revealed that the role of combating piracy and armed robbery against
ships in the Sibutu Passage and surrounding sea areas is within the mandates of the
PNP and PCG, with the AFP serving as a supporting agency. Organizations are given
direction, uniformity, responsibility, efficiency, and clarity in their operations by
policies. This outlines expectations and principles that cooperative members should
follow (CMHC SCHL, 2018).
“[…] our unit has been mandated by higher headquarters to look over the
area of Tawi-Tawi, covering the Sibutu Strait. Our only task here is to support
the cognizant law enforcement units because we are in the military, and our
mandate is to perform the external defense operation. However, because the
Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group are the law enforcement agencies
that require military assistance, we usually conduct joint law enforcement
operations as a supporting effort.”

Acop (2008) says the AFP should focus on warfighting given its limited resources and
reduced development. Combat arms should make up most of its remaining force and
improve the AFP's material capabilities. In the interview, several collaboration
agreements and national policies have been made to promote cooperation and
collaboration. Prominent among said agreements are the JPSCC and NCWC.
Accordingly, the inter-agency approaches facilitated coordination among the different
security forces in the area.
“[…] we close these capability gaps while, thankfully, our national
government recognizes the problem. So, they issued this EO which is also

26

visible to our allies and partners. We were able to establish the National Coast
Watch Council and its Center thanks to grants from the United States, Australia,
and Japan. They even paid for the construction of the center's building. Because
this is an interagency approach, we will require the assistance of other maritime
agencies[…] If we can organize and then operationalize the National Coast
Watch Center concept. Then, perhaps, we can establish a National Coast
Watch, similar to a unified border command, in collaboration with all maritime
agencies and the AFP, which is also covered by that EO. From there, all of the
required capabilities in the area, such as infrastructure and forward workers'
capabilities such as air and sea, will be enhanced.”

According to Edwards (2019), diverse maritime threats complicate enforcement. The
thing that unites PNP, PCG, and AFP is that they are all concerned about their lack
of capability, primarily understood as physical assets. Each agency concerned
understands that more effective resource sharing could close the capability gap.
Coordination problems and some uncertainty over overlapping roles do, however, still
exist. Since their separation in 1998, the PN and PCG have frequently clashed over
resources. Said occurrence might lead to a lack of transparency and, occasionally, a
tense relationship between the two agencies. Despite these issues, coordination has
improved, and agencies are optimistic about improving relations.

“[…] to be honest, we lack the capacity to respond to this act, particularly
in terms of infrastructure and equipment[...] that is why the Joint Peace and
Security Coordinating Center [JPSCC] was formed, of which the Philippine
Coast Guard is now a member. This is what connects us; we have a
coordinating center for it[…] because if something like this occurs, such as
piracy, it is manageable. It simply requires coordination among the three (3)
agencies.”

4.2. International Partnership
The Philippines now places a high priority on international cooperation in the field of
maritime security. The UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme and the PCG co-
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hosted the "Contact Group" on maritime crime in the Sulu and Celebes seas, which
brought maritime security actors from all over the region together. The PCG also
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Indonesian Maritime Security
Agency (BAKAMLA). A TCA between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines is also
developing, incorporating coordinated patrols in the Sulu-Celebes seas and
information-sharing, despite ongoing sovereignty disputes (Edwards, 2019).
However, only the information-sharing protocol had been developed at that point. The
operational level continued to discuss the other protocols. Nevertheless, the three
ministers decided to look into combined air patrols (Quilo, 2018).
“[…] we are now into a continuous working group with them, a joint
working group. The protocols are being finalized regarding information sharing,
protocols on the conduct of joint patrols at sea, and areas of maritime concern
which cover the Sibutu passage. So, it is still in the finalization stage. We are
now on the 17th joint working group, and I believe this supposedly, if not
because of the election, there is already a plan for that. That's why there was
this Philippine side delegation working group meeting the other day to prepare
for the joint working group with Malaysia and Indonesia.”

From the discussions, it was said that security agencies believe that assessment
cannot be done yet, particularly in regional trilateral coordination, because it is still in
process.
“[…] we cannot yet measure the effectiveness because it's still a work in
progress. So, we're still talking with each other on how to in place capabilities.
Acceptable to other countries? Remember, we have some sensitivities with
Malaysia. With Indonesia, we have this opportunity for collaboration because
of the Philippine-Indonesia border crossing agreement. But because of these
dynamics, there is still sensitivity management being undertaken on both sides.
So the trilateral cooperate arrangement for me is not yet in place,”

However, when asked about the TCA's rudiments and the Philippines' readiness
regarding assets and capabilities, infrastructure, and logistical support, all
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respondents agreed that the Philippines is barely ready to meet the basic
requirements when the agreement is finalized.
“[…] so maybe one of the challenges is that we've seen these gaps for so
long, and outsiders should not be the ones initiating or pushing the changes
because having a well-secured border is a basic requirement for any nation,
especially for those of us on the southern border. Historically, it has been very
porous and full of illicit activities that are common to all borders. So the question
becomes, why only now? Maybe we lack focus? The approaches taken by the
various agencies differ. We have different perspectives on borders. We believe
and hope that this EO [57] is an indication that we are beginning to recognize
the need.”
Valenzuela et al., 2020 said it would be years before the AFP’s Philippine Airforce
(PAF) and PN could be at par with their foreign counterparts due to the slow and
tedious asset acquisition process. Even with the Aquino administration's RA 10349 or
Revised AFP Modernization Program, the PA defense budget share is the largest
among the three AFP branches. It outpaces the PAF and PN's combined budget for
most of the decade. Only when the South China Sea dispute peaked In FY 20162017 did PAF and PN spending increase.

Although maritime security is one of the 12 action agenda points in the National
Security Policy, according to Batongbacal (2021), its practical application is limited to
territorial defense and maritime law enforcement, indicating that the concept's current
practical application is less extensive than the official definition would imply.
Policymakers' "land-based perspective" is most likely to blame for the contradiction
between theory and practice. Accordingly, the Philippine government is unaware of
the scope and importance of maritime activities. Furthermore, land-based planning
and management are typically prioritized in the governance of social and economic
activities, among others.
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4.3. Absence of Dedicated SOP in Securing Sibutu Passage
Aside from the Rules on the Use of Force (RUF) and Department Circulars published
in 2017, like DOTr MC 2017-001 on "Safety, Security, and Environmental
Numbering," the interview showed there were no dedicated SOPs, Memorandum
Circulars (MCs), protocols, or other measures in place to stop piracy and armed
robberies against ships going through the Sibutu passage and its adjacent sea areas.
“[…] there is an EO [197] that is yet to be implemented for the PCG to
supposedly check the Ship Security Plan, which is an anti-terrorism and antipiracy mechanism. But there is none [dedicated] for the passage in Sibutu
[Passage]. Because how can we perform the DOTMPLFS or develop our
Doctrine if our Facilities and Equipment are inadequate?[…] Because an SOP
is a doctrine, we do not have a Doctrinal initiative on our part. So, none yet, it is
still weak[...] There should, however, be something specifically for Sibutu
[passage].”

Nonetheless, one respondent stated that the Philippine Congressional Committee is
currently considering the designation of ASL, which includes the Sibutu Passage and
the Basilan Strait. If the initiative is successful, the relevant agencies, particularly the
security sector, will have a solid foundation on which to regulate maritime traffic and
ensure the safety and security of the Philippines' sea lanes. It will also serve as a
foundation for developing infrastructure and other capabilities of the security and law
enforcement forces in the country's border areas.

Furthermore, as revealed in the interview, the PNP does not have a specific SOP
dedicated to securing Sibutu Passage because everything has been done at the
national headquarters.
“[…] we no longer localize because we are reliant on national-level
directives from higher headquarters. So, all we are doing is carrying out what
has been handed down to us.”
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Accordingly, there is no localized version of the national policies/directives that have
to be crafted to attune to the geographic and political peculiarity of the area of study.
As such, law enforcers' actions will be restricted and vulnerable to counter-legal suits
without a solid approach to support them. Said matter points to “the strength of a law
enforcer is as strong as the law protecting them” (C. P. Diciano, personal
communication, June 15, 2015)

As a summary for this chapter, it was discovered that there is no dedicated doctrine
or policy in place to counter and prevent the threat of piracy and armed robbery
against ships in the study area. Relatedly, the basic infrastructure, logistical, and
asset requirements must be in place for a doctrine to be effective. Positively, each
agency recognizes its limitations and understands that each gap can only be filled
through close coordination and collaboration. Although the mechanism for
strengthening partnerships is in the works, its progress is rather slow and far-fetched.
Consequently, the passage of the bill to establish ASL is a notable stimulus that can
support the infrastructure, logistical, and asset requirements of the security forces,
despite having pros and cons among experts.
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Chapter 5: Assessment of Anti-Piracy and Armed Robbery
Efforts in Sibutu Passage
Maritime security is a broad term that means both the safety inside and outside of
ships. Terrorism, piracy, theft, illegal trafficking of goods and people, illegal fishing,
and pollution are all threats to ships and marine operations (Monje, 2012). To
understand the situation in the Sibutu passage and its adjacent sea areas, the
analysis included an assessment of these efforts regarding the operational
mechanisms involved, coordination among different stakeholders, and community or
local participation. This part presents the analysis and interpretation of data gathered
from the survey questionnaire and interviews about implementing maritime security
mechanisms to prevent piracy and armed robbery against ships.

5.1. Operational Mechanisms
Operational mechanisms and responses continue to play a vital role in disrupting the
pirates’ business model on land and at sea (Sloan, 2014). As such, the survey
conducted with respondents from the AFP, PCG, and PNP in table 3 shows how
various agencies performed their respective roles and mandates in securing the
Sibutu Passage and surrounding sea areas. Its interpretation in the data analysis
illustrates that the level of maritime security for countering and preventing maritime
piracy in terms of operational mechanism has a weighted mean of 3.41 with a verbal
interpretation of “sometimes.” This means that 85% of respondents believe that the
security forces' overall operational mechanism for combating maritime piracy and
armed robbery against ships in the research area is adequate.

The statement set of objectives is clearly stated before the operation begins, garnered
the highest mean of 3.52 with a verbal interpretation of “often.” Accordingly, security
personnel from the PCG, PNP, and AFP assigned in the area of the study believed
that they always have a set of operational mechanisms to secure the Sibutu Passage.
These include having a set of objectives clearly stated before the operation begins;
Different government agencies providing useful information for the operation;
Debriefing/post-operation is carried out to improve the agency’s operational
mechanism; Each security agency operates in its respective doctrine/mandate; Each
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agency served as the leading organization to the operations in Sibutu Passage; And
designated concerned unit/department for the development of policies and standard
operating procedures to improve the anti- maritime piracy. According to Webb (2016),
in any operations, objectives help define goals, recognize inappropriate actions, direct
key decision-making procedures, and maintain personnel accountability within the
organization or with another concerned group. Objectives will provide every individual
within the group with a clear picture of the operations.

On the other hand, the statement that respective agencies are conducting research
to enhance the operational mechanism of units operating in the Sibutu area garnered
the lowest mean rating of 3.16, with a verbal interpretation of “sometimes.” Similar
to why research is important in education, defense and security research is essential
to developing the capability and readiness needed to ensure national security since
accessible knowledge sets the limitations of military operational capability and
society's overall preparation (Zagerman, 2022). According to Parshuram et al. (2018),
when planning for strategic ground, air, and maritime operations, high-level decision
makers used research from World War II to help them objectively examine various
alternatives. The military received carefully gathered and focused data from such an
analysis that helped to provide insights that would enable the military to make more
thorough and informed plans and judgments.
Table 3:
Respondents’ operational mechanism to combat piracy and armed robbery against
ships in the Sibutu passage and surrounding sea areas

Item
1. Set of objectives are clearly
stated before the operation begins
2. Information useful for the
operations was provided by
participating government agencies
3. Debriefing/post-operation are
carried out to improve the agency's
operational mechanism
4. Each PNP/PCG/AFP operate in
their respective doctrines

90

71

3

1

3.52

Verbal
Interpretation
Often

81

77

7

0

3.45

Often

83

78

4

0

3.48

Sometimes

92

67

5

1

3.50

Often

Frequency
4
3
2 1
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Mean

5. Your agency served as the
leading organization in the
operations at Sibutu Passage
6. Designated concerned unit or
department for the development of
policies and standard operating
procedures to improve the antimaritime piracy
7. The operational mechanism of
agencies is designed to adapt to
the specifics of the field
8. Maritime patrols are frequently
carried out to ensure the safety
and security of ships passing
through the Sibutu passage and its
adjacent sea areas
9. The agency is conducting
research to enhance the
operational mechanism of units
operating in the Sibutu area
10. After activity reports are
prepared for future reference
11. Civic relations operations are
being conducted to gather support
from the community
12. Operational protocols for
emergencies, disasters, and
pandemic are available
Weighted Mean

82

72

11

0

3.43

Sometimes

94

64

6

1

3.51

Often

74

84

7

0

3.40

Sometimes

70

80

15

0

3.33

Sometimes

53

88

21

2

3.16

Sometimes

71

81

13

0

3.35

Sometimes

71

86

8

0

3.38

Sometimes

70

86

9

0

3.37

Sometimes

3.41

Sometimes

Moreover, security personnel believed that the following mechanisms are often
practiced: The operational mechanism of agencies is designed to adapt to the
specifics of the field; Maritime patrols are frequently carried out to ensure the safety
and security of ships passing through the Sibutu Passage and its adjacent sea areas;
The agency is researching to enhance the operational mechanism of units operating
in the Sibutu area; After the activity, reports are prepared for future references; Civic
relations operations are being conducted to gather support from the community;
Operational protocols for emergencies, disasters, and a pandemic are made
available. Following the above, three themes emerged during the interview among
the security agencies involved in securing the research area to gain a better
understanding of the situation in terms of operational mechanisms: (1) Vast
Jurisdiction; (2) Communication Issues; and (3) Limitation of Maritime Assets:
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5.1.1. Vast Jurisdiction:
One of the main operational concerns of theSsecurity forces

in the Sibutu passage is their AOR’s broad jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction mentioned
CGDNELZN
encompasses the majority of the immense waters of Mindanao, which is considered
one of the most insecure waters in the country due to the current presence of rebels
and terrorist groups. From the interview, it can be construed that operational
mechanisms to
prevent and counter-piracy become challenging because of the vast
CGDNCR-CL
jurisdiction. Almost similar to PNP Maritime Group that covers the BASULTA (Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi) region, the PCG District Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region in Muslim
CGDBCL
Mindanao (CGD BARMM) presently has seven (7) Stations – Cotabato, Western
CGDSTL

Sulu, Eastern Sulu, Northern Tawi-Tawi, Western Tawi-Tawi, Central Tawi-Tawi and
Basih-Balan which encompasses twenty-one (21) substations (see Figure 5 and list
of abbreviations).
Figure 5:

CGDEV
CGDWV

CGDPAL

PCG Area of Responsibility (AOR) distribution in Mindanao
CGDCV
CGDNEM

Source: PCG,CG-3
CGDNM
CGDSWM

CGDBARMM

CGDSEM

CGDSM

Source: PCG, CG-3
Additionally, the interview revealed that the splitting of CG District Southwestern
Mindanao in Zamboanga to allow for the formation of CGD BARMM is operationally
unsound due to geographical, social, and cultural factors. Accordingly, those living in
the island provinces (Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan) are socially and culturally distinct
from those who live on the mainland. The headquarters of PCG District BARMM are
in Cotobato City, which is far away from its stations in Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, and parts of
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Basilan Province. As a result, the additional distance and location of the refueling area
pose a challenge in prepositioning its large patrol vessel.
“[…] the seat of power is driven by economics. Politics, as Karl Marx put
it, is a concentrated form of economics because economics is what drives
politics. The seat of power is in Zamboanga, and we cannot isolate it because
the Command Center and the economic activities are there. So, I strongly
believe that it is operationally unsound[…] due to geographical, social, and
cultural factors. It is extremely difficult for it to come together. The governance
will suffer, which will be a major challenge for CGD BARMM.”

Furthermore, it was discovered that the agency's demand concerning its mandate
demonstrates certain limitations, such as logistical constraints.
“[…] as we manage the conduct of seaborne patrol operations, we must
also keep some fuel reserves on hand in case of an emergency. It is difficult to
exhort all of our resources on patrols and exercises because we must also
reserve some for the real McCoy or actual emergency situations. So, the
challenge is to manage our limited resources, particularly in terms of logistics.”

A maritime-focused effort will probably not be sufficient to completely eradicate piracy
in the area due to the limited number of patrol vessels and the great distances
involved. This issue was also stressed in the case of the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian
Sea. Often burdened by limited capabilities in terms of effective maritime law
enforcement, approximately 25 naval ships patrol the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian
Sea, each with the arduous task of covering an average area of 44,000 square
nautical miles. Additionally, pirates usually move their operations to uncontrolled
waters when naval forces are present in a region (Nelson, 2012; Kouakou et al.,
2022).
5.1.2. Communication Issues: Pirates frequently make use of mobile satellite
systems. According to the interview, communication is one of the most important
factors in any maritime effort. However, communication issues are one of the main
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problems during operations due to the lack of communication infrastructures.
Subsequently, all respondents commented that almost everything was poor – even
the most fundamental electricity supply and cellphone signals.
“[...] when it comes to communication infrastructure, it is still lacking. We
desperately need to upgrade because there are times when our TeleComs have
no signal. For example, last week, the Globe network had no signal from 0600H
to 0900H for three (3) days in a row. For the Smart network, there were
instances where there was no signal for three (3) days. So, we really have a
problem because our primary mode of communication is usually our cell phone.
It is acceptable if all agencies have a radio through which we can transmit
information. And, here in Tawi-Tawi, it is not just our network communication
that has a problem. Even our electricity is unreliable, and if there is a brownout,
our radios are out as well. So, I believe there are still things that need
improvement. Although we are making progress, it is insufficient because we
are so far behind.”

Baldini et al. (2010) said that understanding the maritime world is crucial for dealing
with these dangers, particularly in communication. Various technologies have been
suggested to find and identify boats employed for illegal operations in open waters.
They further proposed identifying illegal vessels in open waters by keeping an eye on
mobile satellite communication emissions, which criminals use to plan their attacks or
get in touch with accomplices on shore. However, given the Sibutu Passage case, the
unstable electricity problem adds more to this challenge.
5.1.3. Maritime Asset Limitations: According to the conversations, one of the vital
components for a successful maritime operation against maritime piracy is a sufficient
number of maritime assets such as patrol boats and watercraft. Respondents also
believed other infrastructure assets besides watercraft and gunboats were important.
Additionally, the value of radar stations in the Philippines was recognized as early as
2017 when Japan announced plans to assist the former country by constructing radar
stations to combat piracy in the Sulu-Celebes region. According to the source, the
increase in incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Sibutu Passage
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from 2012 to 2016 caused a rise in shipping company insurance premiums. As a
result, Japan donated eight radar stations under CGD BARMM AOR to monitor
vessels entering and exiting the passage.

As a summary of this section, it is implied that, while the majority of survey
respondents believed the operational mechanisms for countering piracy and robbery
against ships were satisfactory, the interview with officers in the high echelons of the
three security organizations revealed that there are still more required and needs to
be done. It can be noted that issues such as covering a large jurisdiction with limited
floating assets, communication and infrastructure issues, and other resource
constraints hinder their efficiency. With such gaps identified, the national
government's attention and careful planning on resolving the issue are required at the
soonest possible time.

5.2. Security Forces Coordination
According to Ahmad (2020), cooperation and coordination are necessary for maritime
security operations at the international, regional, and national levels. Effective
coordination and management among the members of the security forces enhance
the participation of the group in responsible monitoring of the implementation of
maritime security against piracy and armed robbery against ships. This will motivate
support and foster commitment among the members’ responsibilities. As such,
domestic government organizations and agencies need to develop successful
information and data-sharing method to prevent gaps and overlaps in the system.

In the survey conducted, the data shows how different agencies performed their
respective mandates. Table 4 shows the response of the personnel from the PCG,
PNP, and AFP when asked about their inter-agency coordination practices in securing
the Sibutu Passage. The data analysis in Table 4 shows that the level of maritime
security for countering and preventing maritime piracy and robbery in terms of
coordination among security forces has obtained a weighted mean of 3.38 with a
verbal interpretation of “sometimes.” On the one hand, the statement coordinating
meetings are being conducted to maintain cooperation among PCG, PNP, and AFP
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obtained the highest mean of 3.41 with a verbal interpretation of “sometimes.” On
the other hand, the lowest mean rating of 3.27 and verbal interpretation of
“sometimes” was obtained by the statement the intelligence report is being shared
with all relevant agencies.
Table 4:
Inter-agency coordination practices of the AFP, PCG, and PNP in the area of study.

To simplify the aforementioned data, the majority of respondents, 139 out of 165, or
84% of the respondents, believe that coordination among the stakeholders is
essential after having the highest mean in the inter-agency coordination practices in
the study area. Ironically, the "sharing of the intelligence report" received the average
rating that was the lowest possible score. Said inconsistency implies that there are
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disparities between and among the various security forces in the study area, which
makes it difficult for them to effectively coordinate and collaborate with one another.
For better understanding, the following section will discuss the factors that contribute
to the difficulties that arise in inter-agency coordination and collaboration.

5.3 Challenges in the Inter-Agency Approach
Despite the importance of security force coordination in the area, it was revealed that
some aspects remained a challenge during the assessment discussion. The following
themes have emerged regarding the coordination among security forces in
implementing maritime security for countering and preventing piracy and robbery and
armed robbery against ships.

5.3.1 Miscommunications Due to Differing Mandates
Based on the quantitative and qualitative data analysis, there is a uniting effort among
the three agencies to enhance interoperability through the tripartite [JPSCC]
agreement. Still, some miscommunications or disagreements may arise due to the
various security agencies' overlapping mandates and operational doctrines. Hence,
the conduct of capability briefings among the different security forces in the area is
deemed necessary.
“[...] that is the reason why we are proposing for the conduct of the
capability brief of respective units[…] because I got feedback from, for example,
one agency that they don't know what's the mandate of the Armed Forces. What
are the limitations? What are the mandates of the other law enforcement
agencies which actually are complementary to each other? So, there's a need
to conduct these things to iron out and improve the understanding with each
other. Thus, it will facilitate good operational mechanisms in the future.”

5.3.2 Interpersonal Relationship vis-a-vis Information Sharing
It was further revealed that although there are many collaboration meetings and
discussions to promote cooperation and collaboration, sharing information remains
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complicated. A respondent even disclosed that some intelligence reports are not
shared with other operational groups. Accordingly, the gap between the various
agencies sometimes widens as leadership and organization members change. It is
noteworthy that AFP, PCG, and PNP follow a particular career path. Consequently, it
is common for officers, personnel, and sometimes the entire unit transfers from one
place to another. As such, It makes the continuation of collaboration and cooperation
more difficult. The lack of solid interpersonal connections among the members of the
security forces may impede information sharing.
“[…] the barriers are that there is still a need to improve the understanding
of how these agencies work. There is still a need to improve the relationship to
sustain it because, from time to time, we change people. We change leadership,
we change members of the organization.”
Furthermore, highlighted in the conversation is the value of interpersonal relationships
between the security forces in the study area. Accordingly, without strong
interpersonal relationships, especially between the heads of the various security
forces, there is a tendency for rivalry over who receives the recognition, particularly
on major accomplishments.
“[…] I believe the barriers are similar to a turf war. We have a competition
among ourselves about who gets the credit. So, if we remove that kind of barrier,
we might be able to improve agency coordination significantly.”
In Monje's (2012) paper, a naval force commander in western Mindanao expressed
his displeasure with how the relevant agencies share information, claiming that they
monopolize it and keep it to themselves. Whelan (2017) asserts that "informal"
relationships are critical not only because they affect formal relationships but also
because that work is frequently carried out within "social networks." Significantly, the
interviewee declared that the three security agencies’ resources, policies, and roles
by themselves do not define compatibility and unity in the field of operation. Instead,
a close relationship is crucially reliant on the appeal to human positive emotions.
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“[…] jointness and interoperability are not defined by the agency’s
resources, rules, and roles alone. But a rather fundamentally contingent on the
harmony of the human element behind – the relationship.”

It was therefore recommended that those in charge of setting up and managing
security networks think about creating plans to encourage the growth of a solid
"network culture" and favorable interpersonal and organizational ties. Unit
commanders may want to concentrate on choosing team members for networks or
creating an environment that innately fosters and uphold a sense of camaraderie. It
was also suggested that the heads of each agency ensure a stable membership with
low staff turnover and opportunities for members to share experiences. The
aforementioned circumstances are likely to foster the development of cooperative
security networks. (Welan 2017).

5.3.3 Confusion in Determining the Lead and Supporting Agencies
It was discovered from the interview that some members of the security forces
sometimes do not support joint operations. There were cases where one believed that
it is time-consuming because they could not reach a consensus on who would decide
or takes the lead, especially when the ranks of the head of agencies are the same or
on the level. It was also discovered that there are even instances wherein the agreed
course of action is not followed.
“[…] that is very common, especially with the actual operation, you know,
if we are working with other government agencies. Number one (1) is, it is timeconsuming. We cannot react immediately because we are still dealing with other
agencies. Because there are numerous agencies involved, it is common that
we do not reach a consensus on how to solve a particular problem. They
sometimes believe that because they are the lead agency, especially if the
ranks of the head of agencies are the same or on the level, they should be the
ones to decide. So those are the times when we cannot reach an agreement on
a solution[…] another problem we see is that the responsible agency is
sometimes not implementing the agreed-upon solutions[…] So that is one of the
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challenges or disadvantages that we encounter when collaborating with other
government agencies.”

For the duration of this section, it can be said that the first step toward close
cooperation and collaboration between and among security forces is to break down
the barrier of division by having a clear understanding of the respective agency's
mandates, promoting and advancing inter-personal relationships, and having clear
guidelines on the roles and functions of each agency in the area of study. Moreover,
other avenues for promoting interpersonal relationships among the various security
forces must also be explored.

5.4 Community Participation
Community involvement in any military operations is vital for its success; therefore,
understanding the nature of the operations through information related can be used
as an instrument to attain desirable outcomes (Department of Army, 2018). Table 5
shows the response of the personnel from the PCG, PNP, and AFP when asked about
their community participation practices in securing the Sibutu Passage and its
surrounding sea areas.
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Table 5:
Community participation practices of the AFP, PCG, and PNP in the area of study

The data analysis in Table 5 shows that the level of maritime security for countering
and preventing maritime piracy and robbery in terms of community participation
obtained a weighted mean of 3.18 with a verbal interpretation of “sometimes.” The
statement of local support and cooperation with the PCG, PNP, and AFP in the
government’s campaign to ensure the safety and security of Sibutu Passage and its
adjacent sea areas has obtained the highest mean of 3.29 and verbal interpretation
of “sometimes.” Community participation aims to build a relationship between the
community and uniformed, open, mutually satisfying, and cooperative services. An
effective community support program enhances how the community views the
uniformed

services and

how

they

value

the

operations

(Sirko

et

al.,

2019). Alternatively, the statement about community participation in anti-piracy and
robbery during emergencies, disasters, and pandemics obtained the lowest mean of
3.09 with a verbal interpretation of “sometimes.” Based on the result of the interview,
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one theme has emerged: Community participation is vital to the success of
security forces' plans and programs.

The PNP has the Coastal Barangay Information Network (CIBN), which provides
updates on what is going on in the sea. The PCG is adding additional Sub Station
units, especially in the coastal communities, to enhance their presence. The
Philippine Marines changed, reorganized their forces, and took over strategic islands
that surrenderers had said were their safe havens. Accordingly, the locals of TawiTawi recognize that the security forces' plans and programs are for public service and
the betterment of the entire community. While the LGU mostly provides assets and
logistical support or other forms of assistance, it was stated that the security forces in
the area of study do not sit on their gaps and deficiencies. They find ways and
optimize the use of their available resources.
“[…] the effort now is to strengthen it some more by consolidating the
populace there - train them, educate them, enhance their capacity to be our
force multipliers. So that's what we are doing now. Continuing to strengthen the
coastal communities because we believe if there are no transient and sheltering
areas [for the criminals], there will be no probability of outsiders conducting this
nefarious activity in Sibutu Strait and in any other areas of Tawi-Tawi.”

For this section, it can be construed from the survey and interview that the community
participation practices of the security sector in the study area were found to be
satisfactory in terms of the degree of support and cooperation received from the local
people for the implementation of efforts in countering and preventing maritime robbery
and piracy. From this data, it can be inferred that each involved agency, in terms of
bolstering community relations, is doing its job in accordance with its respective
mission and mandates.
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Chapter 6: Challenges and Recommended Mechanisms
This chapter discussed the challenges and recommendations based on the data
gathered, as supported by available documents and scholarly articles, to improve the
mechanisms for preventing piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Sibutu
Passage and its surrounding sea areas. These issues and suggestions will then serve
as the foundation for improving the system for anti-maritime piracy and robbery. As
such, four themes emerged from the interview.

6.1 Establishment of a Unified Command
The discussion pointed out that the Tawi-Tawi inter-agency involved have a good
working relationship and are familiar with the concept of working together to combat
piracy and armed robbery against ships. Accordingly, like-minded leaders from the
AFP, PNP, and PCG can usually come up with effective measures to fill the gap of
lack of capabilities.
“[...] what is needed is continuous communication among each other. So
in consensus, we can help each other find ways to address the gaps and the
challenges and be able to perform respective mandates in accordance with their
respective organizational task with the help of other agencies.”

According to Edwards (2019), cautious optimism is growing that the Philippines will
be able to improve maritime security even though there are likely to be gaps in assets
if coordination is improved both domestically and internationally. Members of the
PNP, AFP, and the PCG have all argued that the most crucial next step would be a
maritime security strategy that precisely identifies the issues and priorities of the
maritime security of the Philippines and then specifies the roles of the various
maritime agencies within this. This would advance maritime security issues beyond
geopolitics by highlighting areas of shared interest, defining responsibilities, and
providing a more precise foundation for future action. It would also have the potential
to reduce some of the current coordination barriers. Thus, the interviewee declared
the activation of NCWC in Tawi-Tawi can be a good platform to achieve such.
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“[…] we can professionalize our law enforcement agencies with NCWC
because they will be synchronized. The government will also become more
organized, as well as more effective and efficient[…] we are currently moving
separately. We are making our own efforts and are unaware of what the other
agencies are doing. For example, the coast guard wants to place a monitoring
station in this area, and the navy wants to do the same, but we still can't connect
these stations.”

Based on the preceding premise, it is clear that establishing a unified command
system can facilitate coordination and collaboration among the security forces in the
study area, thereby aiding in the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against
ships. Moreover, the AFP emphasized the importance of inter-agency collaboration,
recognizing that almost all maritime incidents in the area, particularly near the
borders, are the responsibility of maritime law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless,
a grand strategy for a unified command stationed in Tawi-Tawi, like the ESSCOM
[Eastern Sabah Security Command], is needed to synchronize the efforts of the
agencies concerned. Because the NCWC was established by EO, its activation in the
province of Tawi-Tawi, where the Sibutu passage is located, is a good starting point
toward achieving unified command in the area of study.

6.2 Enhancement of Government Support System
In almost every field of a complex environment, the need for additional resources and
infrastructure facilities is overstated. Resources include but are not limited to floating
assets, equipment, budget, and fuel, while facilities cover bases, stable power lines,
etc. The interview uncovered that aside from inadequate infrastructure and other
government support systems in the research area, another contributing factor is poor
governance, poverty, and the presence of armed conflict.
“[…] one of the reasons or actual sources of the problem is poor
governance[…] because of the area's high poverty level. Another factor we are
considering is the presence of armed conflict. So, if we look at it, it has always
been there because the underlying causes of the problem are constant.”
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Moreover, despite numerous cooperation and collaboration initiatives, it was
discovered to be insufficient without the availability of tools and equipment for the
military and law enforcers in the area of the study.
“[…] even though signed agreements exist and we understand each other,
we lack the support of higher headquarters in terms of our resources, such as
personnel, facilities, and floating assets. It will remain ineffective. As of now,
despite agreements with other neighboring countries and agreements with other
agencies, it is not sustainable for us to conduct continuous patrols because they
are expensive in terms of resources such as fuel. So, we need to establish our
communication and monitoring stations, fuel lines, etc. That should be our focus
because, while we say we have efforts there now, in reality, we need more patrol
assets, as well as the establishment and support of higher headquarters.”
Ultimately, providing the necessary personnel, equipment, and resources is crucial in
the struggle against piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Sibutu passage
and its adjacent sea areas. As such, an additional national budget allocation must be
made.
“[…] we must advocate in our Action Plans and Programs. We need the
advocacy of the different agencies. The issue is escalating. Some agencies are
unaware of the EO [57] and even wonder what it is all about. As a result, we
must advocate. Of course, the council must take this seriously. This must be
reflected in the budgets of the various agencies[...] We require a little more
cascading.”
Castro (2017) asserted that lobbying for more resources is complex, and the Navy
continues dominating maritime budgets. Though it was determined to increase the
AFP's capacity for territorial defense, the Philippine government was hampered by a
lack of funding. The government identified the need to update the armed forces,
especially the PN and PAF. Still, it also recognized the limits placed on this effort by
other priorities, such as education and public works.
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6.3. Inter-agency training, exercises, and other avenues to promote
interpersonal relationships
All respondents believed there is a need to enhance and promote inter-agency
collaboration. This is to maximize the use of the tri-agency maritime assets,
resources, personnel, and expertise to quell maritime piracy and robbery.
“[…] existing assets of one agency may not suffice an operation. Thus,
the importance of inter-agency sharing of resources[…] the opportunity that I
see is the combination of the three (3) agencies' experiences. We gain
knowledge and experience from the other two (2) agencies. The PNP can learn
from them. We learn things unfamiliar or stranger to our work as cops. It is
beneficial that this center facilitates the exchange of expertise among the three
(3) agencies. There is definitely room for improvement. The work that we do
involves a knowledge exchange. We believe the police can assist the Coast
Guard or the marines with their problems. We can then learn what we need to
improve based on what we have learned from what they do.”
Considering the gaps and “challenges in the inter-agency approach,” as mentioned
in Chapter 5.3, respondents suggested the conduct of regular inter-agency training,
exercises, and gatherings that can foster better interpersonal relationships.
“[…] to resolve that, in my opinion, we should conduct regular meetings
and fellowship. As they say, before we conduct business, we should become
friends first[...] I believe there is no way to strengthen our bond other than to
conduct inter-operability exercises, training, and expert subject matter
exchanges. This is for us to establish a good relationship with your counterpart
and the other agencies through fellowship. That, I believe, is the crucial point.
In our culture, having a good relationship with other security forces sometimes
precedes everything else. Others are our culture's last priority. The most
important thing for us is establishing good relationships with security
colleagues.”
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6.4. Socio-Economic Programs for the Community
The fourth theme is the need to develop socio-economic programs for
communities. Respondents asserted that the problem of piracy and armed robbery is
straightforward, and to address it, the government has to focus on the root causes of
piracy.
“[…] some experts believe that, as in Somalia, there are problems in the
surrounding seas if there is a problem on land. To address piracy and armed
robbery in Tawi-Tawi, we must first address the problems in the land. So, if the
land is problematic, there will be issues in the seas. Once again, you address
good governance, basic human services, livelihood, etc.”

It was further stated that the security forces in the area need to develop intervention
programs within the sphere of being a law enforcement agency in the security sector.
“[…] who would go pirating if Sibutu, Sitangkai, and Bongao are peaceful
and orderly? If there is order and they have means of subsistence, people would
rather work more decent jobs than piracy or armed robbery. I mean, why would
I keep kidnapping people? That is basic, according to studies in Somalia and
previously here in the Malacca Strait. This is because the area is problematic,
especially on the Indonesian side. There are numerous illegal activities because
the government is weak. As a result, they extend to the seas. However, if they
can solve the problem on the land, it will have an immediate impact on
weakening the pirates. Where will they bring their victims if there is effective law
enforcement on the land? Where will the robbed ships be transported? They will
eventually bring their victims ashore if they commit piracy or armed robbery at
sea. Finally, having a good support system on land, as in other countries, is
essential. Everything on the land must be in order in order to address the
incidents in Sibutu.”

Stach (2017) concluded that it is impossible to eliminate maritime piracy instances in
Southeast Asia completely. People are driven to become pirates for various reasons,
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including economic deprivation in coastal communities, excessive fishing, and a lack
of employment opportunities. In such a short amount of time, addressing all of the
factors that contribute to piracy can be a challenging task. Hence, strengthening the
security sector coupled with socio-economic programs for the community is the first
step towards eradicating such crime.

In summary of this chapter, it was highlighted that the security forces should
strengthen coordination and collaboration while increasing poverty alleviation
programs. Addressing the underlying cause of the problem discussed in this Chapter
may result in the long-term security of the Sibutu Passage and its surroundings.
Furthermore, despite the NCWC's stated goal of promoting security sector
coordination and collaboration, it has yet to be activated in Taw-Tawi. Nevertheless,
for said Center to be effective, the reasons which may cause its failure to meet its
purpose stated in this section and in chapters 4 and 5 has to be resolved.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations
Based on the analysis of the gathered data, the following conclusions are made:

1. There are national policies, interagency agreements, and international
partnerships used by law enforcement agencies on maritime security against
piracy and armed robbery. Still, dedicated procedures are absent for securing
the Sibutu Passage and surrounding sea areas.

The fundamental

organizational, logistical, and resource requirements must be met before a
doctrine can be developed and made effective.

2. The data on assessing the implementation of maritime security efforts to
prevent maritime piracy and armed robbery, the security forces, and the
community have shown efforts to ensure the campaign's success. However,
the organizational structure and system are the obstacles to effectively
enforcing each agency's mandate, aside from the inadequate infrastructure
and maritime assets present in the said area due to the geographical location
and remoteness from the mainland.
3. To enhance the coordination and collaboration of the security sectors in the
area of study, it was found that there is a need to establish a unified command
to synchronize their efforts. Furthermore, regular interagency training,
exercises, and other avenues are needed to promote interpersonal
relationships. Socioeconomic programs for the community are also needed to
educate the people, create employment and alleviate poverty to prevent piracy
engagement.
4. Enhancement of the government support system is also necessary because
collaboration, documents, mechanisms, and measures are useless without
proper tools and equipment. Addressing the challenges and gaps in the
military and law enforcement measures and mechanisms outlined above may
be effective in the long run to quell piracy and armed robberies against ships.
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5. It should be noted that these crimes will still be possible as long as diplomatic
problems that obstruct communication and cooperation between and among
the concerned nations and the root causes of piracy and armed robberies,
such as poverty, poor governance, unemployment, corruption, and social
inequality, among others, are not resolved.
Based on the result of this study, the following measures are recommended by the
researcher to improve the different mechanisms to prevent the threat of piracy and
armed robbery against ships in the Sibutu Passage and its adjacent sea areas.

1. Creation of a dedicated doctrine dedicated to Sibutu Passage and its
adjacent sea areas. Said development includes but is not limited to the
proper allocation of funds for infrastructure development, facilities,
equipment, logistic supplies, and training for the personnel. Conversely,
the assets and capabilities of the security forces have to be in place for
the projected doctrine to be effective.

2. Passing the Archipelagic Seal Lane Bill will serve as the basis for the
growth and development of the area due to appropriate budget allocation.
Although the Archipelagic Sea Lane Bill has its pros and cons, the positive
impacts outweigh its negative effect as far as the security sector is
concerned.
3. Providing resources such as satellite phones for every unit for accessible
communication is highly significant. Furthermore, due to the scarcity of
floating assets, each unit must have at least one. Additional and sustained
fuel and other logistical requirements are also needed as it is critical to the
operation's success.
4. The NCWC has an approved EO and has begun operations in some areas.
Thus, activating it in Tawi-Tawi is strongly advised. Since representatives
from the participating agencies will be housed in one office, the
interpersonal relationships will undoubtedly be strengthened, leading to a
stronger interoperability approach.
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5. Local Government Units surrounding the Sibutu Passage must launch
different socio-economic activities such as seminars, education,
employment, and social support to alleviate the people's poverty. Said
effort will lessen the probability of people engaging in maritime robbery
and piracy.
6. Considering that piracy and armed robberies against ships will still be
possible as long as their fundamental cause exists, it is recommended,
among others, for future researchers to undertake studies related to
addressing the root cause of the problem and have a sustainable solution
to put an end to piracy and armed robbery against ships.
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